Union security agreements are one way of ensuring that all (or nearly all) workers pay their fair share of the costs of collective bargaining (e.g., join the union and pay dues). If the union collapses, each worker may be worse off than if the union had negotiated the agreement. Thus, the incentive is for some individual workers to 'ride for free' by not paying the costs, which can lead to the collapse of the union and no collective bargaining agreement. In labor relations, the free rider problem exists because the costs of organizing a union and negotiating a contract with the employer can be very high, and because employers will find it too costly to adopt multiple wage and benefit scales, some or all non-union members may find that the contract benefits them as well.
A classic study of the free rider problem is presented in Mancur Olson's 1965 work, The Logic of Collective Action. The free rider problem is often cited as the rationale for union security agreements.
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